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As of today, a majority of the negative consequences of the deep Belarusian currency crisis of 2011 
seem to have been realized. Hence, the Belarusian economy is now ‘purified’ from main 
macroeconomic distortions and has a chance for sustainable long-term growth. Nevertheless, there 
are signals that some nominal and real inertia may generate new shocks for the national economy. 
From this view, the money market is of great concern, while interest rates signal maintained high 
inflation expectations. High and unstable expectations may entrap monetary policy and generate new 
shocks for the Belarusian economy. In this policy brief, we deal with a visualization of inflation 
expectations and argue for the necessity of a new nominal anchor in order to stabilize expectations for 
future periods.
In 2011, Belarus experienced the highest 
inflation and devaluation in modern history. 
These were consequences of the automatic 
macroeconomic adjustment determined by a 
number of both long- and short-term 
distortions in the national economy. Changes 
in prices and exchange rate adjusted real 
parameters towards their long-run equilibrium 
level. Hence, from a long-run perspective, one 
may interpret these adjustments as favorable 
since they ‘purified’ the economy from the 
macroeconomic imbalances that may have 
hampered growth. Furthermore, shifting from 
exchange-rate (XR) targeting to a managed 
float is another essential aftermath of the 
currency crisis. Economic authorities had to 
recognize that accommodative monetary 
policy (MP) was not compassable with XR 
targeting since it resulted in a considerable 
overvaluation of the real XR, and 
correspondingly, an incredibly large current 
account deficit. Thus, the new exchange rate 
regime may be argued to be a new automatic 
stabilizer for Belarus, providing the level of 
current account balance consistent with other 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Overall, the 
current stance of the national economy might 
be treated as a chance to “begin again from the 
ground up”. In this sense, the Belarusian 
economy as of today is sometimes compared 
to the Russian economy after its crisis in 1998, 
which then performed particularly high growth 
rates.  
In our opinion, realizing the opportunity for a 
strengthening of long-term growth through 
structural changes undoubtedly should become 
a policy priority of Belarus in the near future. 
However, it should be emphasized that despite 
“purification” from major macroeconomic 
imbalances, there are still a long list of short-
term challenges. In particular, one may stress 
the risks of expansionary policy revival; 
increasing external debt burden; growth in 
non-performing loans, which may undermine 
the solvency of the banking system; reduction 
of foreign demand due to shocks in global 
economy. These risks are more or less 
observable and may be monitored. Hence, the 
realization of one or the other shocks from this 
list might not come as a surprise, and 
economic authorities seem to at least realize 
this, and when possible, take prevention 
measures. 
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At the same time, another challenge seems to 
be more adverse and urgent; namely, the 
question of inflation and devaluation 
expectations. In economic theory, expectations 
play a crucial role in affecting behavior of 
economic agents. Recognition of the role of 
expectations at the money market determined 
intention to “subject” and stabilize these 
within modern monetary policy frameworks. 
In Belarus, given the recent history of high 
inflation and devaluation, corresponding 
expectations of Belarusian economic agents 
are likely to be rather high. Moreover, shifting 
from XR targeting to a managed float has not 
yet resulted in provision of a new nominal 
anchor for the public.  
For instance, disinflation was declared to be a 
priority goal, but there are no strict 
commitments on its numerical value, as well 
as in respect to procedures and mechanisms to 
provide disinflation trends. As of today, the 
Belarusian MP regime can hardly be classified 
as a standard regime. The MP Guidelines for 
2012 assume indicative targets on international 
reserves, refinancing rate and the growth rate 
of banks’ claims on the economy. The latter 
witnesses the propensity to monetary targeting. 
However, the instable relationship between the 
monetary aggregate to be targeted and the 
ultimate goal (inflation), as well as the 
indicative nature of this commitment give rise 
to doubts in respect to treating it as monetary 
targeting. Furthermore, commitment on bank 
claims on the economy can hardly be treated 
as a nominal anchor for the public. According 
to the taxonomy of MP regimes by Stone 
(2004), Belarus is currently closer to the weak 
anchor regime, which assumes “no operative 
nominal anchor…and central bank reports a 
low degree of commitment… and high degree 
of discretion”. 
Thus, our hypothesis assumes that there has 
been an adverse shock in inflation expectations 
due to weak nominal anchor and recent 
experience of huge inflation. If that is the case, 
this may be an additional source of shock for 
the money market, which may cause a new 
wave of macroeconomic instability. In order to 
make policy recommendations, this hypothesis 
needs empirical support. However, it is 
difficult to identify expectations in empirical 
analyses since this variable is typically 
unobservable and cannot be univocally 
measured. Instead, expectations are most often 
treated indirectly through other variables. 
Many central banks deal with the results of 
sociological polls on this issue, but these 
approaches may suffer from different 
economic meanings and measurements of 
inflation expectations by economic agents. 
An alternative approach was proposed by St-
Amant (1996) and extended by Gotschalk 
(2001), who base on famous Fischer equation 
representing current nominal interest rate as 
the sum of ex-ante real interest rate and 
expected inflation. Further, based on the 
approach by Blanchard and Quah (1989), 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
between nominal and real interest rate is 
identified with a number of restrictions, which 
allows decomposing changes in the nominal 
rate to those associated with ex ante real rate 
and inflation expectations. The latter may be 
used as a measure of inflation expectations. 
Such a measure of inflation expectations 
assumes explicit economic meaning referring 
to the money market, i.e. the rate of future 
inflation, which will provide the, by economic 
agents, expected level of interest rate. Taking 
the data from statistics (not polls) and 
international comparability of such estimates 
are important advantages of this approach.  
We applied this methodology to Belarusian 
data (nominal and real interest rate on ruble 
households’ deposits with a term more than a 
year). The obtained time series measure 
changes in inflation expectations in the current 
period for a period of the next 12 months. 
However, our goal is to visualize the level of 
inflation expectation and not changes in 
expectation. Therefore, we use the series in 
levels, choosing January 2003 as the base 
period (when National Bank of Belarus 
actually shifted to XR targeting regime), and 
assigned a zero level (as starting one) to it. The 
obtained series of inflation expectations is 
provided in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Inflation Expectations in Belarus 
 
 
The estimated series of inflation expectations 
show a decrease in 2003 – mid 2005, which 
may be explained by the effectiveness of the 
new nominal anchor (XR), and 
correspondingly the expected disinflation. The 
expectation of reflation in late 2005 till late 
2007 may be explained by the more 
expansionary policy and changes in Russian 
preferences that took place during this period. 
After that, there was a period of stable 
expectation, which is likely to be explained by 
the credibility of the nominal anchor 
(nevertheless, there was a shock in late 2008 
that is associated with the impact of the global 
crisis).  
The most considerable shock took place in the 
beginning of 2010, which has a lack of 
intuitive explanation and might be associated 
with a phase of radically expansionary policy.  
Finally, a new significant shock took place in 
late 2010 – beginning 2011 which might be 
associated with the visualized problems at the 
currency market at that time.  
Currently, there is a very high level of 
inflation expectations and its increased 
volatility in the second half of 2011 seem to be 
of a great importance. It signals that economic 
agents do not treat price shocks as a single-
shot, but mostly tend to consider it as a long-
lasting process. Hence, the absence of a 
nominal anchor and the fresh memory of huge 
inflation seem to be responsible for the current 
high and instable inflation expectations. 
Maintenance of high inflation expectations is a 
dangerous threat for the money market. 
Propagating inflation through expectations 
may be considered as a separate channel 
within the monetary transmission mechanism 
(along with interest rate, exchange rate and 
bank-lending channels). In other words, even 
without additional fundamental preconditions 
for inflation, inflation expectations may 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
However, during the last two months 
(December 2011 and January 2012) this 
adverse effect seems to have been suppressed 
by monetary authorities, as the monthly 
inflation rate reduced radically in comparison 
to average rate in May-November 2011. This 
is likely to be the outcome of the significant 
monetary policy tightening that has resulted in 
a sharp increase in nominal interest rates by 
banks. On the one hand, such nominal interest 
rate complies with the shocks in inflation 
expectations and real ex ante interest rate (the 
latter grew as well at the background of the 
crisis). In other words, current level of 
nominal interest rates will equalize ex post real 
rate with ex ante real rate if the actual inflation 
rate has been as high as current inflation 
expectations. But on the other hand, if actual 
inflation had been much lower than expected 
one (and it tends to be so, in case of keeping 
on conservative MP), ex post real rate would 
be much higher than the ex-ante one. For 
instance, such a situation has already been 
peculiar during December and January: 
according to our estimations, ex ante real 
interest rate in December was about 3.6% in 
annual terms (preliminary data on January 
shows that it in this month it is rather similar), 
but annualized ex post real rate for these 
months is about 30%. 
This suggests that there is a trap for the 
monetary authorities. If they keep high interest 
rates, based on the expected inflation, the 
impact of expectations on actual inflation will 
be mitigated, but the losses, say in terms of 
output, will be high because of the extremely 
high ex post real interest rates. If the monetary 
authorities facilitated the rapid reduction of 
nominal interest rates, current nominal rates 
would not guarantee ex ante real interest 
taking into consideration the high inflation 
expectations, which would then constitute a 
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severe shock for the money market. Hence, the 
mechanism of self-fulfilling prophecy would 
work. 
Furthermore, the increased ex ante real rate 
(and high probability of even higher ex post 
real rate in national currency) could give 
speculative incentives for a number of 
economic agents. For example, many agents 
could increase the share of national currency 
in their savings portfolio, either avoiding 
buying hard currency (which took place during 
the peak of the currency crisis) for new 
deposits, or changing the nomination of their 
deposits to the national currency (i.e. selling 
the hard one). In a sense, this trend may be 
interpreted as the compensation of losses on 
ruble deposits in the last year, which is needed 
to revive the demand for such deposits. But in 
any case, these internal processes (along with 
restricting money supply by the National bank) 
influence the domestic currency market. 
Through this, the supply and demand are 
formed not only due to current and financial 
international flows. Hence, due to these 
incentives for hard currency supply and 
demand, the current value of the nominal rate 
may substantially deviate from the equilibrium 
rate. The latter may be defined as in Kruk 
(2011): the one that may clear the market 
immediately (given short-term trends in 
current account flows at the background of 
medium-term values of other fundamentals). 
 
Figure 2. Actual and Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
 
Note: For 2010Q1-2011Q1 official rate of the National bank is 
taken as actual nominal rate, for 2011Q2 the exchange rate at the 
‘black market’ (used by internet shops), and for 2011Q3 ‘black 
market’ and later the exchange rate of the additional BCSE 
session are taken. 
The assessments of the equilibrium exchange 
rate based on this methodology (Kruk (2011)) 
show that in the third quarter, the actual rate 
almost equals the equilibrium rate. For 
2011Q4, all necessary data is not available yet, 
but an approximate assessment correction of 
the equilibrium rate of the Q3 for average 
inflation between Q3 and Q4 may be used (i.e. 
in real terms the rate should not have changed 
in order to sustain equilibrium). Such an 
assessment indicates that the actual rate in the 
Q4 is again overestimated by roughly 5-10% 
in comparison to the equilibrium rate.  
At a first look, such an ‘overhang’ at the 
domestic currency market seems to not be a 
great problem. But along with the trap 
stemmed from the high and unstable inflation, 
this may contribute and propagate possible 
shock at the money market. Furthermore, this 
‘overhang’ is due to speculative incentives, 
which in turn, are due to high inflation 
expectations. Hence, high and unstable 
inflation expectations are a prime cause of this 
‘overhang’. 
Finally, we may argue that unfavorable 
inflation expectations is a multidimensional 
problem, which generates grounds for shocks 
at the money market and entraps monetary 
policy at the current stage. Therefore, 
restraining inflation expectations must 
currently be an absolute and unconditional 
priority of economic policy.  
This gives rise to the issue of which policy 
tools that are needed for solving this problem. 
Tight monetary policy alone may not be 
enough and/or its losses in terms of output 
may be unacceptably high, especially taking 
into account that keeping the Belarusian 
economy depressed is likely to cause huge 
migration and thus reducing the prospects for 
long-term growth.  
Our view on the problem of inflation 
expectations supposes that they stem both 
from recent experience of very high inflation 
and the absence of nominal anchor. Inflation 
memory cannot easily be removed, but 
introducing a new nominal anchor seems to be 
worthwhile. Among possible options, given 
  
 
5 Forum for Research on Eastern Europe and Emerging Economies 
the desire to preserve autonomous monetary 
policy in Belarus, the introduction of inflation 
targeting (IT) is seen as inevitable. A shift to 
this regime is associated with plenty of 
obstacles and might not be realized 
immediately (Kruk (2008)). A gradual shift to 
IT through its intermediary phases (so called 
IT Lite) is more expedient and complies more 
with the requirement of obtaining new powers 
and capacities at the National Bank of Belarus. 
Taking on more and more strict commitments 
in terms of inflation and implementing 
mechanisms and procedures peculiar for IT 
(the latter is even more important than 
commitments themselves) will increase 
credibility and public trust for the National 
bank. The other side of the coin involves 
decreasing and less volatile inflation 
expectations, which do not challenge monetary 
policy and facilitate low and stable inflation. 
Another advantage of IT is the possibility to 
mitigate price shocks. 
Our main policy recommendation is therefore 
that it is necessary to shift to an IT framework 
as soon as possible, starting from exploiting 
the forms of IT Lite. The advantages of this 
step overweigh all the obstacles, including 
those associated with the reluctance of 
economic authorities to change institutional 
preconditions. 
However, one important clause should be 
emphasized. Shifting to IT (especially 
gradually through IT Lite) does not guarantee 
that current high inflation expectations will be 
reduced automatically and immediately. In 
other words, it does not guarantee that the cost 
of reducing inflation in terms of output will 
decrease (though for the present Belarusian 
situation there are grounds to suspect that it 
would facilitate). For instance, Mishkin (2001) 
shows that “there appears to have been little, 
if any reduction, in the output loss associated 
with disinflation, the sacrifice ratio, among 
countries adopting inflation targeting… The 
only way to achieve disinflation is the hard 
way: by inducing short-run losses in output 
and employment in order to achieve the 
longer-run economic benefits of price 
stability”. However, an introduction of IT 
assumes that new shocks in inflation 
expectations may be prevented, and due to it, 
low and stable inflation will be more likely. 
▪ 
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